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See No Evil: How the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 
Further Muddles the Intent Element of Induced 
Infringement 
By Jeremy Adler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  According to the United States Patent Act (the “Act”), one who “actively induces 
infringement of a patent” is liable for patent infringement.1  This section of the Act holds 
actors accountable for inducing other infringing acts, including making, using, offering to 
sell, or selling any patented invention without the authority to do so.2 
¶2  Until recently, the requisite mental state to assign liability under induced patent 
infringement was largely undetermined.  The Federal Circuit has vacillated between only 
requiring intent to induce the acts that constitute patent infringement3 and a more 
stringent standard requiring knowledge that the defendant’s acts induced infringement of 
the patent in question.4  While the Supreme Court in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB 
S.A.5 finally ruled that the latter interpretation of § 271(b) of the Patent Act was correct, it 
went further.  The Court held that a defendant could willfully blind itself to the fact that 
its actions induced patent infringement and be held liable.  
¶3  This Note will serve as a critique of the Court’s decision to import the doctrine of 
willful blindness into patent law in general and induced infringement in particular.  
Section II will briefly track the development of induced patent infringement liability and 
its mens rea requirement.  Section III will frame the Global-Tech case as an outgrowth of 
the uncertainty surrounding the intent standard in both the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court.  Section IV will describe the origin, purpose, and application of the 
willful blindness doctrine in the criminal context.  Finally, Section V will argue that the 
Court’s adoption of willful blindness to satisfy induced patent infringement’s intent 
requirement was inappropriate in both a theoretical sense and as a matter of 
practical application.   
 
*
 J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013. 
1
 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010). 
2
 See id. § 271(a). 
3
 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[P]roof of 
actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active 
inducement.”). 
4
 See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The plaintiff 
has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or 
should have known his actions would induce actual infringements.”).  
5
 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AND ITS INTENT ELEMENT 
¶4  Secondary liability in patent law was originally expressed in terms of contributory 
infringement.  The common law punished those who aided and abetted the commission of 
a tort.  Courts applied this same doctrine to patent law in cases involving the modern 
equivalent of contributory infringement: those where a defendant assisted another party’s 
infringement by providing a component specially adapted to infringe an owner’s patent.6  
The purpose of wielding this form of liability against defendants is to provide patent 
owners protection from infringement when the truly responsible party is not liable for 
direct infringement or when the direct infringer is impractical to sue.7   
¶5  The paradigmatic instance of contributory infringement occurred when a third party 
sold a component of a patented invention that lacked any noninfringing uses.8  However, 
when the component was a dual-use product that potentially had both infringing and 
noninfringing purposes, courts looked to conduct other than the sale of a component 
when adjudicating indirect liability.9  For example, in Westinghouse Electric & 
Manufacturing Co. v. Precise Manufacturing Corp.,10 the defendants sold transformers 
and condensers that were later used in combination with other parts to “make possible” 
the production of the plaintiff’s patented circuits.11  Although the parts had both 
infringing and noninfringing uses, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals inferred that the 
defendants intended to infringe the patented invention.  Thus the defendants were 
contributorily liable, in part because of their advertisements pointing out how to assemble 
and use the combination in a way that would infringe the plaintiff’s patent.12  In this way, 
the concept of induced infringement originated as a tool to infer intent in a contributory 
infringement case rather than as a separate offense.13  
¶6  However, in 1952, Congress codified in the Patent Act both contributory patent 
infringement and active inducement of infringement as separate theories of secondary 
liability.14  Thus, in § 271(b), the Act states that one who “actively induces infringement 
of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”15  So while contributory infringement under § 
271(c) holds defendants liable for the sale of components used to infringe a patent, 
induced infringement under § 271(b) holds defendants liable for other acts that aid and 
abet direct infringement.  
¶7  While § 271(b) does not contain an explicit knowledge requirement, it is generally 
accepted that an actor must actively and knowingly aid and abet another’s direct 
infringement of a patent to be held liable for induced infringement.16  This understanding 
 
6
 Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 227 (2005). 
7
 Id. at 228. 
8
 Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 375 (2006). 
9
 Lemley, supra note 6, at 227. 
10
 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1926). 
11
 Id. at 209. 
12
 Id. at 211-12. 
13
 Lemley, supra note 6, at 227. 
14
 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2010). 
15
 Id. § 271(b). 
16
 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04 (2011).  See also Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, 
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (pointing to case law and legislative history as imputing the word 
“knowing” into § 271(b)). 
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arises from indirect infringement’s common law origins in accessory liability, which 
historically required the defendant to know that the behavior he or she aided was 
wrongful.17  Moreover, courts have held that active inducement under § 271(b) requires 
that the defendant possess “specific intent” to aid and abet the infringing actions.18   
¶8  In the past, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has split on what exactly a 
defendant must know or specifically intend to be liable for induced patent infringement.  
At times, the court merely held that a defendant who intends to cause the acts which 
constitute infringement could be liable for inducement.19  This standard set the bar for 
liability quite low since “most people [do] intend the natural consequences of their 
acts.”20  Yet at other times, the court set the specific intent standard higher, requiring that 
the defendant not only intend to cause the acts that constitute infringement but, in 
addition, to actually intend to ultimately infringe the patent.21  This distinction constituted 
the underlying doctrinal dispute the Court in Global-Tech set out to resolve.22 
¶9  In 2005, the Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd.23 weighed in on the intent standard for infringement by employing patent law to 
resolve a copyright dispute.  While the Court did not explicitly resolve the Federal Circuit 
split discussed above, it did attempt to explain what types of conduct evidenced 
inducement in both patent and copyright law.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) and a 
group of copyright holders, including motion picture studios, recording companies, 
songwriters, and music publishers, accused Grokster and StreamCast Networks, Inc. of 
distributing their software to purposely enable users to reproduce and distribute 
copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act.24  While the accused software had 
some noninfringing uses,25 the Court refused to apply a rigid rule of secondary liability 
 
17
 Lemley, supra note 6, at 236.  See also Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1194 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The statutory liability for inducement of infringement derives from the common law, 
wherein acts that the actor knows will lead to the commission of a wrong by another, place shared liability 
for the wrong on the actor.”). 
18
 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[M]ere knowledge of 
possible infringement by others does not amount to inducement; specific intent and action to induce 
infringement must be proven.”). 
19
 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[P]roof of 
actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active 
inducement.”); Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying 
the Hewlett-Packard standard for intent to induce infringement). 
20
 Lemley, supra note 6, at 238. 
21
 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It must be 
established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely 
that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.  The plaintiff has the burden 
showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known 
his actions would induce actual infringements.”) (emphasis in original); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic 
Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the Manville Sales standard 
for intent to induce infringement). 
22
 Some have argued that there was no intra-Federal Circuit split at all.  See, e.g., Tal Kedem, Note, 
Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: Which Intentions Pave the Road?, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1465 (2007) (arguing that the court in Hewlett-Packard through its own language merely 
set a necessary, and not sufficient, condition for finding intent to induce infringement).  
23
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
24
 Id. at 920–21.  
25
 While 90% of the files available for download on the defendants’ software were found to be 
copyrighted works, Grokster and StreamCast disputed this number and argued that musical performers 
often disseminated their works for free on peer-to-peer networks to gain new audiences.  Id. at 922–23.     
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that would preclude a finding of copyright infringement merely because the software was 
capable of substantial lawful use.26  Rather, the Court turned to the doctrine of induced 
patent infringement to support its view that other evidence of inducement, “such as 
advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use,” could be 
relevant when adjudicating secondary liability for copyright infringement.27  In relying on 
patent principles, the Court emphasized that inducement required “clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement” and “purposeful, culpable expression 
and conduct.”28  Commentators have differed over the level of clarity exhibited in 
Grokster,29 but the Court undoubtedly framed induced infringement in terms of positive 
intent, evidenced by clear actions, to compel a third party to directly infringe 
another’s patent.          
¶10  Despite the Court’s apparent position in Grokster that induced infringement 
required purposeful conduct, an en banc (in relevant part) Federal Circuit in DSU 
Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.30 complicated matters by resurrecting a standard close to 
negligence to determine inducement liability.  The court invoked prior language used in 
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc.31 to define requisite specific intent for 
induced infringement.  To be held liable, an infringer must intend not only to commit the 
inducing acts but also intend to cause the underlying infringement.32  However, in laying 
down this more stringent standard, the Manville Sales court had originally stated that 
“[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced 
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual 
infringements.”33  After using this quote from Manville Sales to seemingly resolve the 
Federal Circuit split discussed above, the DSU Medical court claimed that the Grokster 
decision validated its articulation of the state of mind requirement because the Supreme 
Court had emphasized “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”34  These two 
concepts, a “should have known” negligence standard and purposeful, culpable conduct 
characterized by specific intent, seem to be at odds with one another.35  Yet, the DSU 
 
26
 Id. at 934.  
27
 Id. at 936.  
28
 Id. at 936–37. 
29
 Compare Gary N. Frischling & Miriam Bitton, Grokking Grokster: Has the Supreme Court Changed 
Inducement Under Patent Law?, 34 AIPLA Q. J. 265, 284–85  (2006) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion 
seems to have converted a relatively bright line rule into an exercise of weighing intent evidence, without 
any firm benchmarks against which to test such evidence.”), with Richard J. Stark & Andrei Harasymiak, 
Inducement of Patent Infringement: The Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of Intent, in RECENT 
TRENDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING RECENT CASES 
AND CONSTRUCTING EFFECTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGIES 111 (2011 ed., 2011) available at 2011 WL 601766 
at 8–9 (arguing that the Court in Grokster made it clear that it was using the substantive law of patent 
inducement to decide the case and that it settled the requisite level of intent).  
30
 DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
31
 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
32
 DSU Medical, 471 F.3d at 1304.  
33
 Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553 (second emphasis added). 
34
 DSU Medical, 471 F.3d at 1305-06 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)). 
35
 See Stark & Harasymiak, supra note 29, at 11–12 (“A negligence-type ‘should have known’ standard 
and a specific intent standard are simply not consistent with one another.  As Justice Holmes famously 
noted, ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled upon and being kicked.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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Medical court endorsed both in the same opinion and declared them equivalent in 
operation and rationale.  
¶11  Following the Grokster and DSU Medical decisions, there was considerable 
confusion regarding how much knowledge and intent a third party must possess in order 
to be liable for induced patent infringement.36  First, the Federal Circuit split in earlier 
decisions between holding liable those who intended actions that induced others to 
directly infringe patents and those who actually intended to bring about the ultimate 
infringement.  Then, even as the Supreme Court in Grokster and the Federal Circuit in 
DSU Medical appeared to favor the latter interpretation, prior Federal Circuit language in 
Manville Sales reared its head and introduced a degree of uncertainty in the analysis by 
suggesting negligence could satisfy the intent requirement.  The suggestion that a 
showing of negligence could somehow suffice to prove induced infringement was a 
reflection of the inherent difficulty of proving intent without a smoking gun and 
foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s use of another type of “should have known” 
standard: willful blindness. 
III. GLOBAL-TECH COMPLICATES MATTERS FURTHER BY INTRODUCING WILLFUL 
BLINDNESS 
A. Factual Background 
¶12  SEB S.A. is a French maker of home appliances that invented a “cool-touch” deep 
fryer for home use in the late 1980’s.37  A plastic outer housing surrounded the deep 
fryer’s metal pot, and a ring suspending the pot insulated the housing from heat by 
creating air space between the two components.38  The invention’s air space ensured that 
the deep fryer’s external surfaces remained cool during the frying process.39  SEB 
eventually obtained a patent for the design in 1991 and successfully sold the deep fryer 
under the “T-Fal” brand.40 
¶13  Sunbeam Products, Inc., a United States competitor of SEB, asked Pentalpha 
Enterprises, Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation,41 to supply it with deep fryers meeting 
certain specifications in 1997.42  To meet those specifications, Pentalpha purchased an 
SEB fryer bearing no U.S. patent markings in Hong Kong and copied all but the fryer’s 
cosmetic features.43  Once Pentalpha copied the design, it retained an attorney to conduct 
a right-to-use study, but failed to inform the attorney that it had directly copied SEB’s 
design.44  After a search in which he did not find SEB’s patent, the attorney issued an 
opinion letter in August 1997 stating that Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any 
 
36
 See id. at 12–13 (listing numerous post-DSU Federal Circuit decisions variously applying either a 
specific intent standard or “knew or should have known” standard). 
37
 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011). 
38
 Id. at 2063–64. 
39
 Id. at 2063. 
40
 Id. at 2064. 
41
 Pentalpha is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., the named petitioner at the 
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patents he had located.45  Pentalpha proceeded to sell the deep fryers to Sunbeam, who in 
turn resold them in the United States under their trademarks and for a lower price than 
SEB’s fryers, precipitating a defection in customers from SEB to Sunbeam.46 
¶14  In addition to suing Sunbeam for direct infringement of its deep fryer patent in 
1998, SEB also notified Pentalpha of the lawsuit soon thereafter.47  Despite this 
notification, Pentalpha continued selling the deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and 
Montgomery Ward & Co., prompting SEB to sue Pentalpha for direct infringement and 
active inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) after settling 
with Sunbeam.48 
¶15  After a five-day trial in federal district court, the jury found for SEB on both counts 
and also determined that Pentalpha’s infringement had been willful.49  Following the 
verdict, Pentalpha moved for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law, arguing that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of induced infringement since 
Pentalpha did not actually know of SEB’s deep fryer patent until it received notice of the 
Sunbeam lawsuit.50  The District Court denied the relevant post-trial motions and entered 
judgment against Pentalpha in the amount of $4,878,341, leading to Pentalpha’s 
appeal to the Federal Circuit.51 
B. The Federal Circuit Decision and “Deliberate Indifference” 
¶16  In affirming the jury’s finding of induced patent infringement, the Federal Circuit 
first considered the scope of DSU Medical,52 which had been decided after the jury 
verdict at the district court level.53  The court determined that while DSU Medical stood 
for the requirement that an inducer under § 271(b) must knowingly induce infringement, 
which necessarily includes that the inducer knew or should have known of the patent-in-
suit, the prior Federal Circuit decision did not “set out the metes and bounds of the 
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.”54  As a result, the court was required to address 
the novel situation that arises when an accused induced infringer does not possess 
knowledge of the infringed patent, as was the case here since Pentalpha did not know of 
the patent until it was put on notice of the litigation involving Sunbeam. 
¶17  The court determined that specific intent, which was required to find inducement, 
was “not so narrow as to allow an accused wrongdoer to actively disregard a known risk 
that an element of the offense exists.”55  The court went on to distinguish this “deliberate 















 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 458 (2010) and aff'd sub nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
52
 DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
53
 SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1375–76. 
54
 Id. at 1376 (“As Chief Judge Michel’s concurring opinion noted, the record in DSU Medical showed 
that the alleged infringer had actual knowledge of the patent-in-suit.  ‘Accordingly, the “knowledge of the 
patent” issue [was] not before us.’”) (internal citation omitted).    
55
 Id.  
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noting that the latter is an objective test “whereas the former may require a subjective 
determination that the defendant knew of and disregard an overt risk that an element of 
the offense existed.”56  Furthermore, the court emphasized that “deliberate indifference of 
a known risk is not different from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual knowledge.”57 
¶18  In its application of the “deliberate indifference” standard to the case at bar, the 
Federal Circuit noted that Pentalpha had copied all but the cosmetic features of SEB’s 
cool-touch deep fryer,58 Pentalpha failed to tell the attorney conducting the right-to-use 
study that it had based its product on the SEB fryer,59 and that Pentalpha’s president was 
“well versed” in the United States patent system.60  The court also stated that while a 
defendant may defeat proof of knowledge through a showing of deliberate indifference 
by providing exculpatory evidence that it actually believed that a patent covering the 
accused product did not exist, Pentalpha produced no such evidence.61  Although 
Pentalpha argued that it should have been excused since the SEB deep fryer it copied 
bore no U.S. patent number, it did not argue that its reliance on a lack of a mark led to a 
belief that the deep fryer was not protected by a patent.62  Furthermore, even if Pentalpha 
had made that argument, the court would not have found it believable unless it was 
supplemented by an explanation for why Pentalpha expected a deep fryer purchased in 
Hong Kong to have U.S. patent markings.63  Thus, the court found that the record 
supported the conclusion that Pentalpha deliberately ignored the risk that SEB had 
patented its deep fryer and that the jury’s finding of inducement was justified.64  
C. The Supreme Court Decision and “Willful Blindness” 
¶19  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision but found 
induced infringement based on a standard of “willful blindness” instead of “deliberate 
indifference.”  Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion first turned to the ambiguous 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  The Court determined that the statute’s reference to a 
party that “induces infringement” does not, on its face, resolve whether that party “must 
persuade another to engage in conduct that the inducer knows is infringement.”65  





 Id. at 1377 (citing United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deliberate avoidance 
is not a standard less than knowledge; it is simply another way that knowledge may be proved); Accord 
Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 84 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We note that a party’s knowledge of 
a disputed fact may also be proved through evidence that he consciously avoided knowledge of what would 
otherwise have been obvious [to] him.”)). 
58
 SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1377 (“The owner of a company related to Pentalpha testified that Pentalpha’s 
engineer took a T-Fal deep fryer and used ‘the same ring that separates . . . the wall making it a cool touch 
unit and the construction, basically everything the same; themostat, it was the same; the timer was the 




 Id. (“Pentalpha’s president, John Sham . . . testified that he was the named inventor on 29 
U.S. patents . . . .”). 
61
 Id. at 1377–78. 
62






 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065.  
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Supreme Court decision66 holding that a contributory infringer under § 271(c) “must 
know ‘that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both 
patented and infringing.’”67  Although the Court in that case was deeply divided, the 
majority opinion noted that the holding had become a mainstay in the law of contributory 
infringement under § 271(c) and thus proceeded on the premise that § 271(c) required 
knowledge of the existence of the infringed patent.68  With that premise in mind, the 
Court held that § 271(b) required the same level of knowledge given the common origins 
of both provisions and the fact that each provision’s language creates the same 
interpretive choice.69  Thus, the Court once and for all resolved the Federal Circuit split 
regarding the level of knowledge required of an inducer under § 271(b). 
¶20  The Court then rejected the Federal Circuit’s use of the deliberate indifference 
standard, yet upheld its decision by employing the doctrine of willful blindness to satisfy 
the knowledge requirement under § 271(b).70  SEB had argued in its brief that Pentalpha 
would possess requisite knowledge under a willful blindness standard and that the 
Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” standard was just another formulation 
of willful blindness.71 
¶21  The Court first noted that willful blindness was established in the criminal law as a 
way to hold defendants accountable when they “deliberately shield themselves from clear 
evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”72  It cited the 
traditional rationale for willful blindness as the belief that a defendant who willfully 
blinds himself is just as culpable as someone who has actual knowledge.73  Since the 
doctrine had gained wide acceptance in the federal judiciary,74 the Court saw no reason 
why it should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement.75  
¶22  Willful blindness, according to the Court, contains two basic requirements: “(1) the 
defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and 
(2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”76  The Court 
emphasized that this formulation identifies the willfully blind defendant “who can almost 
be said to have actually known the critical facts.”77  Additionally, the Court distinguished 
the willful blindness test from the less stringent deliberate indifference standard applied 
by the Federal Circuit. It observed that the deliberate indifference standard allowed a 
finding of requisite knowledge when there was only a “known risk” that the induced acts 
 
66
 See generally Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
67
 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067 (internal citation omitted). 
68






 Brief for Respondent at 33–43, Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) 
(No. 10-6), 2010 WL 5488407.  
72
 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068–69. 
73
 Id. at 2069. 
74
 The Court noted that every federal Court of Appeals, with the possible exception of the D.C. Circuit, 




 Id. at 2070. 
77
 Id. at 2070–71. 
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were infringing.78 But deliberate indifference did not require active efforts by the inducer 
to avoid knowing of the infringing nature of the act.79 
¶23  Although the Federal Circuit had employed the less demanding deliberate 
indifference test, the Supreme Court ruled that the jury “could have easily found” that 
Pentalpha willfully blinded itself to the infringing nature of the sales it encouraged 
Sunbeam to make before it was put on notice by SEB’s lawsuit in 1998 against 
Sunbeam.80  The Court reasoned that (1) SEB’s cool-touch fryer “was an innovation in 
the U.S. market when Pentalpha copied it” with growing sales and that Pentalpha knew 
this, (2) Pentalpha believed that that SEB’s fryer embodied advanced technology valuable 
in the U.S. market since it copied only the cosmetic features of SEB’s fryer, (3) Pentalpha 
decided to copy a deep fryer in Hong Kong with the knowledge that products in foreign 
markets do not usually bear U.S. patent markings, and (4) Pentalpha failed to tell the 
attorney conducting the right-to-use study that the product to be evaluated was simply a 
knock-off of SEB’s deep fryer.81  Taken together, these details amounted to an easy case 
in the mind of the Court, even under the more demanding willful blindness test.  
¶24  Justice Anthony Kennedy was the only dissenter.  He approved of the majority’s 
initial construction of § 271(b), but disagreed with its invocation of willful blindness and 
suggested that the Federal Circuit should review the lengthy trial transcript with the new 
willful blindness test in mind on remand.82  Kennedy took issue with the Court’s ready 
acceptance of the notion that those who willfully blind themselves are equally culpable as 
those who have actual knowledge.83  Perhaps, Kennedy suggested, a person’s culpability 
depends on one’s reasons for remaining blind.84  Regardless, he believed this moral 
question should be left to the political branches, especially since the purposes of 
punishment in criminal law are wholly different from the utilitarian purpose of patent law 
found in the Constitution.85  Additionally, Kennedy questioned the majority’s reliance on 
the Federal Judiciary’s acceptance of willful blindness as a trivial exercise in “counting 
courts.”86  Finally, Kennedy noted that there was no need to invoke a novel doctrine since 
facts supportive of willful blindness may suggest actual knowledge and juries often use 
circumstantial evidence to infer knowledge from conduct.87 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF WILLFUL BLINDNESS IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 
¶25  Before assessing the wisdom of the Court’s decision to invoke willful blindness in 
the civil patent context, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the doctrine’s use and 
justifications in criminal law. 
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 Id. at 2072, 2074. 
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 Id. at 2073.  The majority takes issue with this assertion, arguing in a footnote that utilitarian concerns 
do not demand a stricter standard for knowledge.  Id. at 2070 n.8. 
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 Id. at 2073. 
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¶26  Willful blindness originated in the English common law as a substitute for actual 
knowledge, and early English judicial authorities referred to a state of mind where one 
“wilfully shut his eyes” as “connivance” or “constructive knowledge.”88  In the late 19th 
century, several English cases appeared in which innkeepers and hall-porters denied 
knowledge of gaming on their premises.  However, the courts stated that when a 
defendant purposely avoids acquiring knowledge, the requirement of actual knowledge 
was unnecessary.89    
¶27   There are three general uses of willful blindness in the criminal law.  First, it is 
sometimes employed by courts as circumstantial evidence to infer that a defendant had 
actual knowledge but pretended not to possess that knowledge.90  Other times, willful 
blindness may be used to satisfy a required mens rea that is different from and less 
stringent than actual knowledge.91  Finally, the most prevalent and controversial use 
occurs when a court employs willful blindness to satisfy the mens rea of 
actual knowledge.92 
¶28  The predominant justification for substituting willful blindness for actual 
knowledge is the “equal culpability” thesis, maintaining that those who willfully blind 
themselves are as culpable as those who possess actual knowledge.  In Global-Tech, the 
majority endorsed this idea when it justified its decision to adapt willful blindness to 
patent law.93  The thesis is deemed by some to be essential if willful blindness is to be 
considered as a defensible theory of liability at all.94  
¶29  The Court in Global-Tech also hinted at another rationale for the use of willful 
blindness.  Justice Alito’s majority opinion suggested that those “who know enough to 
blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those 
facts.”95  As will be argued below, the addition of this justification in the Court’s 
reasoning confuses the operational nature of willful blindness as it relates to patent law 
because it implies that willful blindness is merely a tool to turn evidence suggestive of 
knowledge into evidence of actual knowledge.  
¶30  The Model Penal Code contemplates willful blindness by providing an exception to 
the knowing state of mind required for some criminal offenses.  The Code defines acting 
knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense96 and allows that mental state 
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 Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 YALE L.J. 
2231, 2233 (1993). 
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 Id. at 2233–34. 
90
 Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1360 (1992). 
91
 Id. at 1360.  For instance, the doctrine may be used to satisfy recklessness or even negligence.  Id.  
92
 Id. at 1361. 
93
 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011) (“The traditional rationale 
for [willful blindness] is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have 
actual knowledge.”). 
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 See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal 
Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 
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second mental state.”). 
95
 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069 (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
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 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material 
element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the 
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to be established by awareness of a high probability of a fact’s existence when that 
particular fact is an element of the offense.97  An important distinction between this 
formulation and the one used by the Supreme Court in Global-Tech is the added 
requirement that the defendant consciously avoid learning the existence of that fact.  
¶31  In addition to the Model Penal Code’s portrayal of willful blindness, there are two 
others that consistently crop up in judicial opinions: recklessness-based descriptions and 
willfulness-based constructions.98  The former involves expressions including: “recklessly 
stated as facts matters of which he knew he was ignorant”; “recklessly and willfully 
closed his eyes to sources of information”; and “demonstrated at the very least a reckless 
indifference to the truth.”99  The latter involves statements like “purposely refrains from 
obtaining . . . knowledge”; “willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact”; and 
“deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.”100  
¶32  As one can observe even from this brief and simplistic overview of willful 
blindness in criminal law, the doctrine is not as monolithic as the Court in Global-Tech 
presented it.  There are differing justifications, uses, and definitions of willful blindness 
that together generate a complex picture of the doctrine’s deployment in criminal cases.  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has imported the current confused nature of 
willful blindness into patent law. 
V. INTRODUCING WILLFUL BLINDNESS INTO THE INDUCED INFRINGEMENT INTENT 
ANALYSIS RAISES A HOST OF ISSUES 
¶33  The Supreme Court’s decision to employ willful blindness as a tool to determine 
whether a defendant possesses the requisite level of knowledge in induced patent 
infringement cases had both theoretical and practical implications that only served to 
complicate, rather than clarify, the inquiry.  While this Note focuses on the decision’s 
impact on the adjudication of induced infringement, it is worth mentioning that willful 
blindness may now very well pervade contributory infringement analysis under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c) since the Court explicitly based its intent analysis on the common origins of 
contributory and induced infringement. 
A. Willful Blindness is Not a Universally Accepted Doctrine 
¶34  As an initial matter, it should be noted that willful blindness as a doctrine is not 
unanimously accepted and commentators have attacked the concept on multiple levels.  
The “equal culpability” thesis rests on unstable ground and is not well-defended.101  The 
 
such a result.”). 
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 Charlow, supra note 90, at 1368–71. 
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principal objection to the thesis is that it legally equates the culpability of a dishonest 
person with someone who has genuine knowledge and that not all dishonest people are 
equally culpable.102  It is also unclear if future courts will be certain which version of 
willful blindness to apply.  Although the Supreme Court in Global-Tech did not adopt the 
Model Penal Code’s approach to willful blindness, which disregards the actions of the 
defendant when faced with the high probability of the existence of a fact, the Court has 
used the Code’s formulation in other cases in the past.103  Any court that unwittingly 
applies the Model Penal Code’s use of willful blindness to induced infringement would 
be subject to the criticisms usually leveled against the Code’s version of the doctrine.104  
Finally, some have argued that the doctrine should incorporate a motive element in order 
to identify among willfully blind defendants those who are actually culpable.105 
B. Global-Tech’s Language Does Not Clarify Which Notion of Willful Blindness It Uses 
¶35  Another doctrinal issue raised by the Court’s use of willful blindness was its 
confused justification.  In its introduction of willful blindness, the Court first referenced 
the traditional rationale of the doctrine: that those who willfully blind themselves are just 
as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.106  But in the sentence that immediately 
followed, the Court announced: “It is also said that persons who know enough to blind 
themselves to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those 
facts.”107  The Court appears to have conflated two distinct uses of willful blindness: (1) 
as a way to hold a defendant that does not actually have knowledge of the patent liable, 
and (2) as an evidentiary tool to prove the defendant does indeed have knowledge of the 
patent.108 In practice, the difference between these two may be negligible since actual 
knowledge and willful blindness are equally culpable levels of awareness.  A court can 
look at a set of facts and conclude that a defendant either had actual knowledge or 
willfully blinded itself to shield actual knowledge.  The result in both cases is the same 
after Global-Tech: the defendant is liable for induced patent infringement under § 271(b). 
 
thinking of doing would violate the law.’  Perkins and Boyce are clearly correct in their generalization 
about honest people.  Their argument shows that the wilfully ignorant defendant is indeed culpable; his 
behavior hardly conforms to an ideal of honesty.  Nonetheless, their argument does not show that the 
culpability of the wilfully defendant is equal to that of the defendant who possesses genuine knowledge.  
How can the degree of culpability of a particular defendant be ascertained by reference to the objective 
standard of an honest person?  Not all dishonest persons are equally culpable.”) (quoting ROLLIN M. 




 Marcus, supra note 88, at 2240. 
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J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 231–32 (1990)(arguing that the Model Penal Code’s formulation of 
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REV. 1245, 1252 (2008). 
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 See Charlow, supra note 90, at 1360 (“[P]roof that a defendant appeared deliberately to avoid 
knowledge could be circumstantial evidence from which to infer that the defendant really did know but 
pretended not to know.”). 
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¶36  But if the Court has indeed allowed the use of willful blindness as an evidentiary 
tool to infer actual knowledge, it has done so needlessly.  As will be discussed below, 
courts have already been inferring actual knowledge from circumstantial evidence for 
some time now.  To introduce a wholly novel (at least in the patent context) theory to 
essentially do the same work circumstantial evidence does is unduly repetitive and 
complicates matters by adding an unnecessary level of analysis that obscures the 
core issue of knowledge. 
C. Punishment Rationales in Patent and Criminal Law Differ 
¶37  Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s argument in dissent that punishment rationales 
differ between criminal and patent law109 deserves more attention.  While the principal 
theories for punishment in criminal law are retributivism and consequentialism, including 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,110 the basis for the Act and its dictates lies 
in the utilitarian language of the Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”111  Holding a willfully blind criminal defendant liable might deter an actor 
from taking steps to avoid knowledge even in the face of a high probability that an 
incriminating fact exists.  But even if this same sequence would hold true in the civil 
patent context, the Act’s infringement sections might simply serve as mechanisms to 
enforce the rights of patent holders rather than deem what is morally culpable behavior 
and what is not.  Since intellectual property rights generally strike a balance by supplying 
rights holders with defensive weapons to fend off other potentially socially beneficial 
innovators,112 patent law in particular should not seek to punish the latter group unless 
their actions fall within the narrowly defined scope of infringement.   
¶38  Moreover, even if the Patent Act contemplates moral culpability, it has been 
suggested that inducers are “considerably more culpable in the patent infringement 
context” since direct infringement is a strict liability offense and those liable under 35 
U.S.C § 271(b) must “actively” induce.113  If this is true, it makes little sense to invoke a 
doctrine effectively lowering the standard of knowledge to bring additional defendants 
under the umbrella of a more serious type of patent infringement.     
D. Knowledge of a “High Probability” That a Patent is Infringed Requires a Legal 
Determination  
¶39  In addition to the theoretical complications it creates when introduced into patent 
law, the willful blindness doctrine will be practically difficult to translate into the patent 
context.  It is not immediately obvious what constitutes a “high probability” that a 
particular innovation or product is patented and infringed.  Put simply, a defendant must 
make a subjective legal determination in order to be aware of a high probability that it is 
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inducing infringing acts of a third party.114  The defendant may well be consciously 
inducing certain actions, but it is only liable for induced infringement if it is aware that 
those actions infringe a patent, which is a legal determination in itself.  Willful blindness 
obscures the analysis further because it holds a defendant liable even if it is not actually 
aware that a patent exists.  The defendant may only subjectively believe there is a “high 
probability” a patent exists and is infringed and can still be held liable for inducement if 
it takes deliberate actions to avoid learning of these facts.  In a judicial setting, a court 
must make these post-hoc determinations, which are exceedingly difficult considering 
that patents themselves grant only probabilistic rights if they are awarded,115 and 
predictability in innovation and patent protection varies among industries.116 
E. The Facts in Global-Tech Make a Supposedly Difficult Standard Easy to Meet 
¶40  While the Court in Global-Tech emphasized that “willful blindness” was a more 
stringent burden of proof than “deliberate indifference,”117 the case’s particular facts 
effectively weaken its potency and render it easier to prove.  One commentator stated 
“there was little in the record to justify a ‘high probability’ that SEB had patented the 
fryer in question.”118  It might have been reasonable for Global-Tech to believe that SEB 
had not patented the particular features Global-Tech copied, and nothing in the record 
indicated the patenting habits of a French company in the kitchen sector.119  The Court 
itself in Global-Tech stated that “a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate 
actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said 
to have actually known the critical facts.”120  Thus, the Federal Circuit going forward may 
feel increasingly emboldened to find induced infringement under an easy-to-meet 
standard following a rare Supreme Court affirmance of the Federal Circuit. 
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F. Circumstantial Evidence, Although Imperfect, Already Serves as a Useful Tool to 
Infer Intent to Induce Infringement 
¶41  Rather than introduce a wholly new doctrinal concept to bring defendants under the 
purview of § 271(b), the Court should have relied on old-fashioned circumstantial 
evidence to infer intent.  Rarely will there be a smoking gun indicating that a defendant 
was certainly aware of the consequences of its actions.  Before Global-Tech, courts were 
already grappling with the lack of proof in induced infringement cases by using 
circumstantial evidence.  The Federal Circuit in Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, 
Ltd.121 explicitly recognized the necessity of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement 
when direct evidence was unavailable.122   
¶42  To be sure, many of the issues of application that plagued the Court and prompted 
it to turn to willful blindness were likely rooted in the unsatisfactory nature of 
circumstantial evidence.  The use of circumstantial evidence is imprecise and can 
sometimes lead to a finding of “hindsight intent,” that is, a court’s belief that a defendant 
knew it was inducing infringement all along because it turned out that a patent existed, it 
was valid, and it was infringed.123  But willful blindness carries with it these same 
problems along with the issues discussed above.  The vices inherent in the use of willful 
blindness make it an unviable alternative to the current practice of inferring 
actual knowledge from available evidence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶43  The Supreme Court’s use of willful blindness has added another wrinkle in the 
muddled area of intent to induce patent infringement.  By invoking a doctrine that itself 
has problems of justification and application, the Court has introduced a host of new 
policy and practical issues into inducement analysis.  The rationale for willful blindness 
in criminal cases, questioned itself, is not readily translatable to the patent context.  
Additionally, practical application of willful blindness to induced infringement is fraught 
with issues.  Ultimately, the Court opened a can of worms by making an already confused 
area of law even more complex with ambiguities and uncertainties.  This Note advocates 
for a return to the admittedly imprecise, yet simpler, use of circumstantial evidence to 
infer intent to induce infringement. 
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